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The “Right” Recipes for Security Culture: A Competing 
Values Model Perspective  
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study argues that the effect of perceived organizational culture on the formation of 
security-related subjective norms and the level of compliance pressure will vary based on how the 
employees perceive their organization’s cultural values. These perceptions reflect on the 
assumptions and principles that organizations use to guide their security-related behaviors. To 
make these arguments, we adopt the competing values model (CVM), which is a model used to 
understand the range of organizational values and resulting cultural archetypes. 
Design: This study conducted a survey of working professionals in the banking and higher 
education industries and used Partial Least Squares (PLS)-Structural Equation Model (SEM) to 
analyze the data. In a series of post-hoc analyses, we ran a set of multi-group analyses to compare 
the perceived organizational cultural effects between the working professionals in both industries. 
Findings: Our study reveals that perceived organizational cultures in favor of stability and control 
promoted more positive security-related behaviors. However, the different effects were more 
pronounced when comparing the effects between the working professionals in both industries. 
Originality: This study is one of the few that examines which cultural archetypes are more 
effective at fostering positive security behaviors. These findings suggest that we should be cautious 
about generalizing the effects of organizational culture on security-related actions across different 
contexts and industries. 
Keywords: Organizational culture, security compliance pressure, security subjective norms, 
competing value model  


































































The culture of an organization (i.e., its values and assumptions) is a key factor that affects how 
employees behave in an organization (Briody et al., 2018; Hartnell et al., 2019). One important 
action that employees take each day are voluntary and involuntary information security (InfoSec) 
behaviors (Posey et al., 2015). The culture of an organization helps define the appropriate InfoSec 
behaviors, which may create strong perceived security-related subjective norms (Hu et al., 2012). 
Forming an organizational culture that promotes mindful InfoSec actions is an important step in 
fostering employees’ secure behaviors (da Veiga et al., 2020). However, many organizations have 
found it difficult to create such a culture, which leaves them vulnerable to threats originating from 
their employees (AlHogail, 2015; Chang and Lin, 2007). 
A security-aware organizational environment is one that shapes attitudes that encourage 
employees to protect the organization’s information assets by mindfully following their InfoSec 
policies (ISP) (da Veiga and Martins, 2017). A str ng security-aware organizational environment 
minimizes the risks of computer misuse (AlHogail, 2015) and shapes good InfoSec practices 
(Chang and Lin, 2007). It is unclear, however, what values organizations should promote to create 
a strong security-aware environment. For instance, should an organization value flexibility and 
discretion over stability and control? Should an organization value integration (emphasis on the 
employees) over differentiation (emphasis on the organization)? The prior literature has not 
provided clear answers to these questions in an InfoSec context, which is problematic because 
organizations have many different values that it must balance when forming their organizational 
culture and establishing their security-aware environment (Wiley et al., 2020). As such, our paper 
addresses the following important research question: How do employees’ perceptions of their 
organizational cultures influence InfoSec related subjective norms and compliance pressures? 
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To answer this research question, we draw on the competing values model (CVM), which is a 
values-based theoretical model used to understand and evaluate organizational culture (Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh, 1983). The CVM proposes that organizations balance competing values along two 
primary dimensions: 1) organizational structures (flexibility versus stability) and 2) primary focus 
(internally focused versus externally focused). We argue theoretically that how an organization 
balances these competing values will help determine its security-related subjective norms and its 
overall security compliance environment, because employees typically act based on whether their 
organizational culture condones or condemns specific behaviors (Schein, 2010).  
To evaluate empirically how these competing values impact security-related outcomes, we 
surveyed working professionals in the banking and higher education industries. We found that 
employees (across both industry segments) who perceived that their organizations valued stability 
and control had strong perceived security-related subjective norms and security-related 
compliance pressures (i.e., pressure to comply with its organization’s ISP). In a series of post hoc 
analyses, we found that these effects varied significantly across industries, which suggests that the 
effects of organizational culture on security-related outcomes may not be broadly generalizable. 
Theoretical Background  
Security-Related Subjective Norms and Security Compliance Pressure 
The human aspect of ISP compliance in organizations has been and continues to be an 
important area of academic research (Jeon et al., 2020; Kim and Han, 2019; Vedadi and Warkentin, 
2020). The prior literature has used many theories to explain how and why employees comply with 
ISPs (Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Moody et al., 2018). One consistent finding across these different 
theories is that subjective norms (i.e., perceived social pressures based on the shared beliefs) affect 
employees’ propensity to perform a variety of security-related actions (Aurigemma et al., 2019; 
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D’Arcy et al., 2009). If channelled properly, these security-related subjective norms create a sense 
of social pressure to act in a secure manner (Herath and Rao, 2009a, 2009b), which may be a key 
factor of creating a strong security aware environment across organizations (Ifinedo, 2014). 
This stream of literature has also documented the multitude of challenges that managers face 
convincing their employees to follow the ISPs (Moody et al., 2018; Siponen and Vance, 2010).  
Organizations invest significant time and energy making their employees aware of the ISPs, but 
employees still routinely fail to comply with those ISPs (Wiley et al., 2020). Thus, it is important 
for organizations to impose compliance pressures in their settings. ISP compliance pressures are 
built on both external (i.e., regulatory pressures) and internal (i.e., security polices and practices) 
factors (Hu et al., 2007). Facing external regulatory pressures, organizations will turn inward and 
compel its employees to stay compliant (Kam et al., 2019). We then argue that an organization’s 
compliance pressure is reflected on its employees’ perceptions toward ISPs compliance. 
Competing Values Model (CVM) 
Schein (2010) posits that organizational cultures embody artifacts (organizational attributes), 
values (adopted norms), and assumptions (taken-for-granted beliefs). Our study is specifically 
interested in values because values are the forces that determine what actions are deemed 
acceptable in an organization (Cameron and Quinn, 2011). Organizations balance a series of 
competing values along a variety of dimensions, which defines their cultures (Marinova et al., 
2018; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). From an InfoSec perspective, if, for instance, an organization 
values speed over diligence, then that might adversely affect InfoSec actions because secure 
behaviors might consume more time and effort (Aurigemma and Mattson, 2019).  
Interestingly, not all employees have the same perceptions about their organizations’ cultures, 
because different employees have different organizational experiences that shape their perceptions 
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about their organizations (Chatman and O’Reilly, 2016). For instance, an employee working in the 
marketing department of a bank may form different perceptions of the organization’s culture 
relative to an employee working in the information technology (IT) department based on the 
different projects that they work on and the different social interactions that occur in their 
workplaces. These various perceptions of the same organization may result in different mental 
schemas related to how employees believe that they should act (Schein, 2010).  
 
Figure 1. Cultural Archetypes (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983) 
To examine these organizational values, we chose the CVM.  As a parsimonious yet powerful 
values-based model (Marinova et al., 2018), the CVM it is one of the most influential models that 
has been used to explain organizational effectiveness, culture, and leadership (Cameron, 1986; 
Iivari and Huisman, 2007). Organizations ascribe to many values but the CVM empirical research 
has found two consistent values that explain organizational effectiveness (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 
1983). The first value pertains to stability. An organization may value stability, control, and order 
on one end of the continuum or flexibility and agility on the other end of the continuum (Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The second value pertains to the focus of the organization. Along this 
dimension, an organization may have an internal (strong organizational processes) or an external 
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(consumer relationships) value orientation (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). That is, organizations 
will either focus internally on their organizations’ social and technical systems or adapt to the 
external environment defined by threats and opportunities (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Together 
these values form four quadrants with each signifying a distinct set of organizational, cultural, and 
individual values. The intersection of both value dimensions creates four organizational cultural 
archetypes: hierarchical, rational, entrepreneurial, and team cultures (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991; 
Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Figure 1 graphically displays the four cultural archetypes. 
An organizational culture may espouse one or more of these cultural archetypes due to an 
organization having many subcultures, which may create contradictory or competing values within 
and between organizations (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). Each axis highlights opposing ends of 
the continuum (i.e., flexibility versus stability and internal versus external). Therefore, these values 
shape organizational cultures that are contradictory along each axis and diagonally, forming 
paradoxical propositions (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). That is: 
“Because certain pairs of concepts are located at opposite poles in the spatial model, they can 
share no place in a consistent and convergent theory of organization. The argument might 
contend that, for every proposition that could be derived from such an analytical approach, its 
contradiction could also be derived.” (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983, p. 374) 
Organizational cultures in the four quadrants (see Figure 1) are not mutually exclusive. For 
instance, a bank may mostly espouse a hierarchical culture that is inwardly focused on complying 
with regulations, but that same bank may also adopt a rational culture that is outwardly focused on 
adapting to market forces (Paulin et al., 1999). Therefore, an organization may have contradictory 
values within its own organizational boundaries and between other organizations either in the same 
or different industries (Cooper and Quinn, 1993; Denison and Spreitzer, 1991).  
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The information systems literature has used the CVM to examine the relationship between 
organizational culture and the adoption of system’s development methodologies (Iivari and 
Huisman, 2007), to assess the effect of knowledge transfer on IT implementations (Harrington and 
Guimaraes, 2005), and to study the effect of organizational culture on software development (Shih 
and Huang, 2010). Particularly germane to our study, Chang and Lin (2007) used the CVM in a 
study, which revealed that control-oriented cultures had a strong effect on InfoSec behaviors, but 
flexible-oriented cultures had a negative or no effect on similar behaviors. Built on their study, we 
argue that certain organizational cultures facilitate InfoSec behaviors via normative pressures. 
Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
Figure 2: Proposed Research Model 
Encouraging employees to comply with their organization’s ISPs is one of the main problems 
that InfoSec managers face (Aurigemma et al., 2019; Moody et al., 2018). Organizational culture 
is a key element in creating a compliance centric environment (Ifinedo, 2014) and in creating 
positive security-related subjective norms (da Veiga et al., 2020; Wiley et al., 2020), which we 
argue produces significant pressure to comply with the organization’s ISPs. Hence, our dependent 
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variables are the perceived pressure to comply with the organization’s ISPs and the perceived 
security-related subjective norms in an organization. Figure 2 shows our proposed research model. 
Perceived Entrepreneurial and Team Organizational Cultures 
Perceived team and entrepreneurial organizational cultures highlight certain organizations’ 
propensity to be flexible and adaptable (Cooper and Quinn, 1993; Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). 
These types of perceived organizational cultures value change and often do not have well-defined 
ISPs. On the one hand, being flexible, such as not having rigid policies, promotes agility, which 
enables organizations to respond to new threats quickly (Tallon et al., 2019). On the other hand, 
however, flexibility makes it difficult for organizations to develop in-depth ISPs and related 
training programs. Routines generally require stable or habitual actions by its employees (Dönmez 
et al., 2016), which can be difficult to develop if the operational procedures are in a constant state 
of flux. This suggests that the flexible nature of these organizational cultural archetypes may make 
it difficult to develop consistent routines (Karlsson et al., 2018), which may result in a lower 
propensity to develop strong perceived InfoSec subjective norms. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H1a: Perceived team organizational cultures are negatively associated with perceived 
security-related subjective norms. 
H2a: Perceived entrepreneurial organizational cultures are negatively associated with 
perceived security-related subjective norms. 
As noted earlier, the CVM creates paradoxes in organizations (Marinova et al., 2018; Quinn 
and Rohrbaugh, 1983). In an InfoSec context, we argue that perceived team organizational cultures 
instigate a paradox. While the flexibility of team organizational cultures may hinder the growth of 
security-related subjective norms, team collaboration may still facilitate perceived compliance 
pressure built on organizations’ intentions to remain compliant with their ISPs. Organizations that 
have perceived organizational team cultures are internally oriented with clearly defined business 
processes (Cooper and Quinn, 1993). These processes may promote a strong security-aware 
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environment (assuming that the processes have a security component) within specific teams. 
Moreover, increased organizational commitment have been shown to be positively correlated with 
this cultural archetype (Goodman et al., 2001; Lee and Edmondson, 2017), which fosters teamwork 
and the collaborative effort of staying compliant with the organization’s ISPs. Therefore, behaviors 
that are deemed to be damaging to the team are discouraged in this cultural archetype (Gelfand et 
al., 2004; Schreuder et al., 2017). One type of damaging behavior is not following the ISPs and 
putting the team (and later the organization) at a security risk. Thus, we propose: 
H1b: Perceived team organizational cultures are positively associated with perceived 
compliance pressure. 
In contrast, perceived entrepreneurial organizational cultures have an external instead of an 
internal focus. Organizations with entrepreneurial cultures tend to take risk, adapt to their external 
environments (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991), and maintain fewer formal procedures due to its 
outward value proposition (Wang, 2010). These types of organizational cultures seek external 
legitimacy based on their product or service offerings as opposed to seeking legitimacy based on 
their internal work processes (Navis and Glynn, 2010; Vaast et al., 2013). Often these types of 
organizational cultures foster technology-mediated work practices (Hargadon and Douglas, 2001; 
Ratten, 2019), but those practices may not have a strong focus on the security risks due to their 
often-fleeting nature. Also, organizations with entrepreneurial cultures tend to have chaotic work 
environments (Ahmetoglu et al., 2018), giving the appearance of making their policies up “on the 
fly”. This may be problematic for security-related behaviors. We then propose: 
H2b: Perceived entrepreneurial organizational cultures are negatively associated with 
perceived compliance pressure. 
Perceived Rational and Hierarchical Organizational Cultures 
Rational and hierarchical organizational cultures highlight certain organizations’ desire to have 
stable environments (Cooper and Quinn, 1993). Organizations with these types of perceived 
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organizational cultures often have well-defined objectives, are goal-oriented, and are somewhat 
bureaucratic (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991; Scheibe and Gupta, 2017). From a compliance 
perspective, stability is probably preferable over flexibility because it is easier to train employees 
on ISPs that do not constantly evolve (Dhillon et al., 2016). Stable organizational structures also 
make it easie  to identify roles, responsibilities, and accountability for InfoSec matters. Moreover, 
employees are subject to peer pressure when perceived security-related norms are well-defined 
(Chen et al., 2019), which will tend to be the case in more stable organizational cultures.  
We propose that employees working for organizations with a perceived rational organizational 
culture will weigh the costs associated with establishing sound internal controls with the benefits 
of reducing their risk exposure when making InfoSec related decisions (D’Arcy and Lowry, 2019). 
Thus, a perceived rational organizational culture should offer an environment that fosters effective 
security controls for preventing security breaches because it makes economic sense to do so (i.e., 
benefit of stakeholders’ trust is larger than the cost of applying security controls). As such, we 
argue that employees working in this cultural archetype will form strong norms and routines 
surrounding InfoSec actions due to economic reasons. We then theorize:  
H3a: Perceived rational organizational cultures are positively associated with perceived 
security-related subjective norms. 
H3b: Perceived rational organizational cultures are positively associated with perceived 
compliance pressure. 
Hierarchical organizational cultures are methodical and rules driven with a focus on structured 
internal processes (Denison and Spreitzer, 1991). Iivari and Huisman (2007) established that this 
cultural archetype enables management to enforce mandatory actions for system implementations. 
We then posit that a hierarchical organizational culture may drive compliance behaviors and create 
perceived security-related subjective norms through a top-down approach, because this cultural 
archetype enforces the rules through a command and control organizational environment (Denison 
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and Spreitzer, 1991). This environment may effectively increase compliance pressure and create 
perceived subjective norms (Yazdanmehr et al., 2020). Thus, we propose: 
H4a: Perceived hierarchical organizational cultures are positively associated with perceived 
security-related subjective norms. 
H4b: Perceived hierarchical organizational cultures are positively associated with perceived 
compliance pressure. 
Perceived Security-Related Subjective Norms 
Our final prediction is related to the link between perceived security-related subjective norms 
and the perceived pressure to comply with the organization’s ISPs. This link has been well 
established in a variety of disciplines including InfoSec. The greater the perceived subjective 
norms to perform a security action, the greater the likelihood that an individual will perform that 
security action (Herath and Rao, 2009a; Ifinedo, 2014). We have no reason to believe that these 
prior results will not hold in our model of the different cultural archetypes. Thus, we propose: 
H5: Perceived security-related subjective norms are positively associated with perceived 
compliance pressure (irrespective of cultural archetype). 
Research Methods  
Research Design 
To investigate our research model empirically, we surveyed working professionals in the 
banking and higher education industries. We selected employees in these two industries due to 
their contrasting (both real and perceived) cultural characteristics and compliance environments. 
For instance, the higher education industry is subject to the regulations established by the Family 
Education and Privacy Act (FERPA) but the penalties for FERPA violations are not particularly 
severe. In the banking industry, however, banks must comply with a series of regulations 
established by Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) and the Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLBA) with major 
fines for not complying with these mandatory regulations. With such notable differences between 
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both industries, we expected to have enough variation and contrasting values to examine the 
distinctive organizational cultural effects across the four cultural archetypes. 
To determine the organizational culture of the organizations where our subjects worked, we 
used their perceived organizational values. We decided to measure each subject’s perceptions of 
their organizations instead of attempting to subjectively categorize each of their organizations 
based on the four cultural archetypes for two main reasons. First, in the same organization, 
employees share different experiences, which shape their perceived organizational cultures 
(Harrison et al., 2019). For instance, an employee who works primarily in collaborative teams with 
supportive colleagues will have much different perceptions of their organizations’ culture relative 
to an employee in the same organization who works in a bureaucratic department with 
unsupportive colleagues. These socialization differences may create dramatically different cultural 
perceptions about their organizations’ values. For this reason, many scholars argue that culture 
must be measured and analyzed at the individual level (Bochner and Hesketh, 1994).  
Second, the perceptions of our research subjects’ organizations are more valuable than our 
subjective classification of their organizations. For instance, if an employee who works in an IT 
department at a bank perceives that their organizational culture is entrepreneurial, then that 
employee works under the assumption that their bank has an organizational culture that is 
somewhat entrepreneurial. The perceptions of the employees represent their reality related to their 
organizational cultures, which guides their behaviors in the organization (Harrison et al., 2019).  
Measurement Items and Instrument Validation 
We used existing measurement items from pre-validated multi-item scales for several of our 
latent constructs (Helfrich et al., 2007; Herath and Rao, 2009a). For other latent constructs that did 
not contain pre-validated multi-item scales, we used the items from Hu et al. (2007) as our starting 
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point to build our own measurement items. To build these items, we first used a panel of expert 
InfoSec researchers to provide an initial content validity of our adapted and new items. We then 
had four Certified Information Systems Security Professional’s (CISSP) review our items. After 
an iterative process of getting feedback and refining our measurement items, we finalized our items 
and designed our survey instrument using best practices related to instruction wording and question 
order as advocated by Dillman et al. (2014). On our final survey instrument, all measurement items 
used 7-point Likert scales. Finally, to remedy potential common method bias procedurally via our 
survey instrument, we used best practices suggested by Podsakoff et al. (2012), particularly related 
to the proximal separation of the measurement items used to capture our independent and 
dependent variables. After that, we ran a pilot study with 51 InfoSec professionals. As a result of 
our participants’ feedback, we refined our items to rectify identified ambiguities. On our final 
survey instrument (see Appendix A), all measurement items were randomized to reduce the 
adverse effect of question ordering on our results (Podsakoff et al., 2012).  
Data Collection 
We sent our survey electronically to managers and IT professionals who worked in the banking 
and higher education industries in the United States. In our data, we did not permit entry-level 
employees to participate because entry-level employees may be so new that they might not realize 
their organizations’ culture, ISPs, and values. We identified research subjects in these two 
industries based on alumni networks from two public universities in the United States. Originally, 
200 participants were invited to participate in our survey. We received 40 responses, which gave 
us a response rate of 25%. We removed 3 subjects from the sample because they did not complete 
the entire survey instrument, which made those data points not usable. We then recruited additional 
participants in a second round of data collection using Qualtrics. After both rounds of data 
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collection, we had a final sample size of 125 in the banking industry and 135 in the higher 
education industry. All of our participants had more than 5-years professional work experience but 
not necessarily at the same organization. The average age of our participants was 38 for the 
banking subjects and 46 for the higher education subjects (see Table 1). 
[Insert Table 1] 
To assess the potential adverse impact of non-response bias on our results, we ran a series of 
ANOVAs (Analysis of Variance) comparing early and late responders on our key constructs. 
These ANOVAs showed no statistically significant differences between the two groups of 
respondents, which suggests that non-response bias was not a major issue with our study. 
Data Analysis and Results 
We used Partial Least Squares (PLS)-Structural Equation Model (SEM) with SmartPLS 
version 3.2. to analyze our survey data. The key advantages of using PLS-SEM are (1) it relaxes 
the normal distribution assumptions required by the maximum likelihood method and (2) it is 
better at estimating complex models with relatively small sample sizes (Gefen et al., 2011; Hair et 
al., 2019). Using PLS-SEM, we first assessed the validity and the reliability of our measures and 
then tested our hypotheses using the standard bootstrapping method (with 1000 resampling). 
Measurement Model 
We evaluated convergent validity using the average variance extracted (AVE), Cronbach’s 
alpha (CA), and composite reliability (CR) values (see Table 2). AVE values greater than 0.5 and 
CA and CR values greater than 0.7 are considered acceptable thresholds for establishing 
convergent validity (Chin, 1998; Fornell and Larcker, 1981). Our values met these thresholds. 
[Insert Table 2] 
We then analyzed the square root of the AVE for each construct to establish discriminant 
validity. Tables 3 and 4 display these values. When the square root of the AVE for each construct 
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is larger than the correlations between that construct and all of the other constructs in the model, 
then that is evidence of discriminant validity (Chin, 1998). In our data, we met these criteria.  
[Insert Table 3] 
[Insert Table 4] 
Moreover, we analyzed the factor loadings of each measurement item on its intended construct 
(see Appendix B). All of our items loaded greater than the recommended threshold of 0.7 (Chin, 
1998). The factor loadings also showed that the difference between the loading on the intended 
construct and the loading on any other construct was greater than 0.1. Therefore, we have strong 
evidence of both convergent and discriminant validity in our data (Gefen and Straub, 2005). 
[Insert Table 5] 
Perceived compliance pressure (COMP) was the only formative construct in our research 
model. Table 5 displays the item weights for each indicator variable in this formative construct. 
The variance inflation factors (VIF) for each measurement item were below 3.3, which suggests 
adequate construct reliability for this formative construct (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw, 2006). All 
of the other construct measurement items met the requirements to be considered reflective 
indicators of their respective latent constructs based on the criteria set forth by Petter et al. (2007). 
Finally, we tested for the presence of common method variance of the measurement model using 
the unmeasured latent method factor approach outlined by Podsakoff et al. (2012). In our data, 
adding a first-order method factor whose only measures were the indicators of the theoretical 
constructs of interest that share a common method did not reveal any major issues.  
Structural Models for Hypothesis Testing 
[Insert Table 6] 
Using PLS-SEM, we assessed both the effect size (F2) and the null-hypothesis significance test 
for all models and paths. An F2 larger than 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 signifies small, medium, and large 
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effect sizes (respectively) (Cohen, 1977). Table 6 shows the results of structural models. We found 
that perceived entrepreneurial (β = 0.167, p < 0.05), team (β = 0.129, p < 0.05), and hierarchical 
(β = 0.185, p < 0.001) cultures fostered perceived compliance pressure, but perceived rational 
culture (β = 0.093, p > 0.05) did not. While perceived entrepreneurial cultures predicted perceived 
compliance pressure, it was in the opposite direction of our hypothesis (i.e., positive instead of 
negative path coefficient). Thus, H1b and H4b were supported but H2b and H3b were not.  
The perceived cultural archetypes that valued control and stability were significant predictors 
of perceived security-related subjective norms (hierarchical: β = 0.193, p < 0.001 and rational: β 
= 0.306, p < 0.001), but perceived entrepreneurial (β = 0.077, p > 0.05) and perceived team (β = 
0.041, p > 0.05) cultures were not. Since both perceived entrepreneurial and team cultures valued 
flexibility over control and stability, these cultural archetypes did not support subjective norms 
that usually grew in a stable organizational setting. Of the significant paths, the effect sizes were 
relatively small. Overall, we find support for H3a and H4a but no support for H1a and H2a.  
Next, we found that perceived security-related subjective norms fostered perceived compliance 
pressure (β = 0.437, p < 0.001) with a moderate effect size (F2 = 0.276), which supported our H5 
prediction. Our results also show that perceived security-related subjective norms fully mediated 
the relationship between perceived rational culture and perceived compliance pressure. 
Cross Industry Post-hoc Analyses 
Next, we ran a set of multi-group analyses (MGA) to compare the perceived cultural archetypes 
between our banking (n=125) and our higher education (n=135) participants. The prior literature 
proposes that there could be a general industry effect due to varying values among employees 
working across different industry segments (Chiasson and Davidson, 2005; Kam et al., 2019). To 
make our results meaningful, we assessed measurement invariance of our measurement items 
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between the two different industry groups. To do this, we ran the three-step process outlined by 
Henseler et al. (2016) using the built-in Measurement Invariance of Composite Models (MICOM) 
procedure in SmartPLS. Our data satisfied the criteria for compositional measurement invariance 
(see Appendix C). Table 7 and Figure 3 show the results of our MGA. 
[Insert Table 7] 
We found a few noteworthy differences. First, perceived hierarchical culture fostered 
perceived compliance pressures (β = 0.408, p < 0.001) and perceived security-related subjective 
norms (β = 0.368, p < 0.001) with our banking sample, but not with higher education sample. 
These path coefficient differe ces for perceived hierarchical cultures were statistically significant 
for perceived security-related subjective norms (β difference = 0.281, p < 0.01) and perceived 
compliance pressure (β difference = 0.301, p < 0.05). Thus, perceived hierarchical culture created 
security-aware settings only in our sample of banking employees.  
Second, perceived team cultures had a positive effect on perceived security-related subjective 
norms among our higher education employees (β = 0.220, p < 0.05), but had no such effect (β = -
0.044, p > 0.05) among their banking counterparts. These path coefficients were significantly 
different (β difference = 0.264, p < 0.05). This effect, however, was positive and not negative as 
we predicted in H1a. This is probably because higher education institutions tend to espouse team-
oriented culture (Kezar et al., 2020; Smart and St. John, 1996) but team-oriented culture may not 
be common in the banking industry, which might have affected our respondents’ perceptions. 
Third, perceived entrepreneurial culture created perceived compliance pressure (β = 0.319, p 
< 0.001) with our higher education sample but not with our banking sample (β = 0.037, p > 0.05). 
This difference was statistically significant between both groups (β difference= 0.282, p < 0.05). 
Again, this finding may be due to not many banks having an entrepreneurial culture. 

































































Figure 3: Structural Model Testing Results 
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Finally, we found the same fully mediated effect of perceived rational organizational cultures 
across both industry samples. In both industry groups, perceived rational cultures only affected 
perceived compliance pressures via perceived subjective norms. However, we found no 
statistically significant differences between the path coefficients between both groups. 
Discussion 
We demonstrated empirically that the different perceived cultural archetypes have important 
ramifications for, but different impacts on, perceived security-related subjective norms and 
compliance pressures. When we analyzed our entire sample together in a single model, we found 
that only the organizational cultures that favored control and stability (i.e., perceived rational and 
hierarchical cultures) had a positive effect on the formation of perceived security-related subjective 
norms. We found no such effect for organizational cultures that valued flexibility (i.e., perceived 
entrepreneurial and team cultures).  
The different effects of the four perceived cultural archetypes became even more pronounced 
when we split our sample between the banking and higher education samples. Our findings 
disclose that many banking organizations are heavily influenced by perceived hierarchical culture, 
whereas most of the colleges and universities appear to be driven by perceived team and 
entrepreneurial cultures. We assert that these differences may be due to: 1) different industries tend 
to attract different types of employees and 2) organizations with specific organizational cultures 
tend to attract different types of employees (within and between industries) (Kam et al., 2019; 
Schneider et al., 1998). For instance, a perceived team culture in the higher education industry may 
attract a different type of employee relative to a perceived hierarchical culture in that same 
industry. Moreover, the types of employees interested in pursuing careers in the banking industry 
are probably different from those interested in pursuing careers in higher education. These 
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different personality will shape the culture of the organizations across industries (Schneider et al., 
1998), which will affect the formation of perceived subjective norms.  
We found that perceived rational cultures had similar effects across both industries. This 
similarity might be due to the fact that performing a security action by rationally calculating its 
benefits and its costs are somewhat industry agnostic (Bulgurcu et al., 2010). Therefore, on some 
level, most organizations have some elements of rationality (but with varying degrees) embedded 
in their organizational cultures and in their normative routines, which includes security-related 
subjective norms. Although organizations may define rationality differently, the idea of 
performing a cost-benefit analysis in relation to performing important daily tasks (including 
security-related tasks) is done consistently across organizations and industries. 
We predicted a negative effect of perceived team and entrepreneurial cultural archetypes (H1a 
and H2a) on perceived security-related subjective norms but found no effect for either. The flexible 
nature of these cultural archetypes might not be conducive to creating subjective norms in these 
types of organizational cultures. Subjective norms take time and procedural consistency to develop 
in an organization (Cabrera and Bonache, 1999; Herath and Rao, 2009b). This development might 
not be possible if the policies, procedures, and routines constantly change, which is more likely in 
these perceived cultural archetypes (Karlsson et al., 2018). Therefore, a null relationship between 
these two perceived cultural archetypes might be a more logical prediction.   
We predicted a negative effect of the perceived entrepreneurial cultural archetype on perceived 
compliance pressure (H2b) but we found a positive effect. Conceptually, this type of organizational 
culture fosters an open system of information sharing (Cooper and Quinn, 1993). Information 
sharing supports fast response to emerging security-related threats (Maitlo et al., 2019; Pérez-
González et al., 2019), leading to a positive effect on an organization’s compliance environment. 






























































ation Technology & People
21 
 
Procedurally, we tested this hypothesis using employees in higher education and banking, which 
are mature industries. If we were to test this proposed effect with a sample of employees working 
in Silicon Valley, we might have a result that is more consistent with our prediction.  
We predicted a partially mediated effect for the perceived rational cultural archetype and 
perceived compliance pressure through perceived security-related subjective norms (H3b), but we 
found the effect to be fully mediated with no direct effect between perceived rational culture and 
perceived compliance pressure. Because perceived rational cultures value efficiency (Denison and 
Spreitzer, 1991), we argue that promoting security-related subjective norms such as embracing a 
shared belief of non-disclosure to protect data confidentiality may foster efficiency of InfoSec 
behaviors. However, perceived compliance pressure entails perceived organizational expectations 
of ISP compliance. ISPs outline the overall security objectives, but they do not necessarily share 
the operational details (Chapple et al., 2018) that suggest the efficiency of an InfoSec safeguard. 
Research Implications and Limitations 
Theoretical Contributions 
Our study contributes to the behavioral InfoSec literature in two important ways. First, the core 
theories that scholars used in the extant literature have generally not included the possible 
mediating, moderating, or direct effect of organizational culture on InfoSec related behaviors. The 
core behavioral InfoSec theories mostly assume the effects of those theories will be the same 
regardless of the organizational environment. Our results suggest that this might not be the case 
based on how they balance competing values. Future studies could investigate the role of different 
organizational cultures in (for instance) protection motivation theory to determine if the type of 
organizational environment might strengthen or weaken those theorized effects.  
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Second, our results suggest that there might not be a universal effect of organizational culture 
on security-related behaviors (Tams, 2013). We established empirically that the different cultural 
archetypes create conflicting values within organizations (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983), which 
either inhibit or enable the formation of perceived security-related subjective norms and perceived 
compliance pressures. Given these differences, it is hard to say definitively that one specific 
cultural archetype will always create a heightened sense of security awareness across all industries. 
Thus, another interesting area of future research could build from our results by investigating the 
conditions under which each of the four cultural archetypes create or do not create strong security-
aware settings. Our post-hoc analyses examined a potential industry effect, but other contextual 
conditions might mediate or moderate our proposed relationships. 
Practical Implications 
Our paper suggests that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to manage an organization’s ISPs. 
InfoSec managers must know their organizational culture and manage accordingly. For instance, 
our results suggest that perceived team and entrepreneurial cultures do not promote the formation 
of strong perceived security-related subjective norms. However, strong perceived security-related 
subjective norms are still an important mechanism to protect an organization’s information assets. 
Thus, InfoSec managers may need to find an alternative way to create strong perceived security-
related subjective norms in team and entrepreneurial organizational cultures. 
The culture of an organization is not developed specifically for InfoSec. Instead, the 
organizational culture is shaped by the mission, strategy, and values of the organization (Briody et 
al., 2018). We suggest that it is important for senior-level managers to understand that the overall 
organizational culture could positively or negatively shape the InfoSec environment. Therefore, 
although we are not suggesting that senior-level managers create an organizational culture 






























































ation Technology & People
23 
 
specifically for security purposes, we propose that senior-level managers be mindful of the indirect 
effects that high-level strategic decisions might have on the security environment. By doing so, 
they can then manage InfoSec in the context of the espoused organizational culture. 
We did not test specific managerial interventions related to security-related behaviors in our 
study, but our results do suggest that different managerial approaches might work better or worse 
in certain organizational cultures. For instance, in perceived team cultures, InfoSec managers may 
want to cultivate strong security-related subjective norms through shared governance instead of 
through a top-down approach given the collaborative nature of this cultural archetype. Conversely, 
a top-down approach might work effectively in perceived rational and hierarchical organizational 
cultures given their internal and process-oriented value orientation. Thus, our key message to 
practitioners is to make security-related decisions in the context of their organizational culture. 
What works in one organizational culture may not work effectively in a different setting. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Like all research, our paper has several limitations. First, organizational culture evolves over 
time, but our study took a snapshot of each of our subject’s perceptions of their current 
organizational settings. We cannot offer any insights into what might happen when employees’ 
perceptions of their organizational cultures change over time. Thus, scholars should be cautious 
about referencing our findings in organizations that have undergone several organizational culture 
changes. An interesting future study might examine organizational culture change and how that 
amplifies or nullifies our theorized relationships. Second, our measurement items did not include 
any context specificity or clear domain specification, which was suggested by Siponen and Vance 
(2014). Future research could extend or validate our findings by using scenario vignettes to 
contextualize specific security-related actions. Third, our sample only included two industries. 
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These two industries provided a sufficient variance along the four cultural archetypes to examine 
our proposed theoretical relationships both within and between industry groups, but we make no 
claims that both industries represent all industries.  Future research could investigate theoretically 
and empirically how our proposed relationships might vary across additional industries. 
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All Samples Banking Sample Higher Education Sample 
CA CR AVE CA CR AVE CA CR AVE 
ENT 0.943 0.972 0.946 0.947 0.945 0.973 0.937 0.933 0.968 
HIE 0.911 0.943 0.846 0.840 0.905 0.940 0.855 0.919 0.947 
NORM 0.930 0.956 0.878 0.926 0.960 0.974 0.825 0.894 0.934 
RAT 0.909 0.942 0.845 0.859 0.918 0.948 0.790 0.869 0.919 
TEAM 0.924 0.952 0.868 0.869 0.925 0.952 0.864 0.922 0.950 
Table 2. Construct Validity and Reliability 
 
 
 ENT HIE NORM RAT TEAM 
ENT 0.968     
HIE -0.094 0.925    
NORM 0.175 0.204 0.908   
RAT 0.352 0.383 0.384 0.889  
TEAM 0.476 0.128 0.356 0.544 0.930 
Table 3. Discriminant Validity & Inter-Construct Correlations (All Samples) 
Note: Shaded cell are square root of AVE 
 
 
Banking Sample Higher Education Sample 
ENT HIE NORM RAT TEAM ENT HIE NORM RAT TEAM 
ENT 0.973 
    
0.968     
HIE -0.218 0.917 
   
-0.094 0.925    
NORM 0.142 0.406 0.962 
  
0.175 0.204 0.908   
RAT 0.184 0.184 0.468 0.927 
 
0.352 0.383 0.384 0.889  
TEAM 0.308 -0.096 0.045 0.193 0.932 0.476 0.128 0.356 0.544 0.930 
Table 4. Discriminant Validity & Inter-Construct Correlations  
Note: Shaded cells are square root of AVE 
 
 
 Banking Higher Education 
18-29 26 20.80% 16 11.86% 
30-44 50 40.00% 19 14.07% 
45-60 49 39.20% 100 74.07% 
> 60 0 0 0 0% 
Total 125 100% 135 100% 
Male 60 48.00% 73 54.07% 
Female 65 52.00% 62 45.93% 
Total 125 100% 135 100% 
Faculty 0 0 43 31.85% 
Middle Mgmt. 106 84.80% 60 44.44% 
Upper Mgmt. 13 10.40% 7 5.19% 
IT Professional 57 15.60% 25 18.52% 
Total 125 100% 135 100% 



































































All Samples Banking Sample Higher Education Sample 
VIF Item Weight VIF Item Weight VIF Item Weight 
COMP1 2.463 0.260 (2.053)* 2.206 0.410 (2.306)* 2.597 0.054 (0.329) 
COMP2 2.374 0.508 (3.757)*** 1.820 0.230 (1.009) 2.883 0.683 (4.087)*** 
COMP3 2.392 0.339 (3.577)*** 1.965 0.499 (4.397)*** 2.497 0.334 (2.522)* 
Table 5. Formative Construct Validity and Reliability  
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
 




Size (F2)  
Supported 
H1a TEAM → NORM 0.041 (0.602) 0.067 0.042 0.001 No 
H1b TEAM → COMP 0.129 (2.130)* 0.061 0.126 0.022 Yes 
H2a ENT → NORM 0.077 (1.098) 0.070 0.078 0.006 No 
H2b ENT → COMP 0.167 (2.477)* 0.067 0.167 0.038 No 
H3a RAT → NORM 0.306 (4.500)*** 0.068 0.305 0.077 Yes 
H3b RAT → COMP 0.093 (1.336) 0.070 0.095 0.010 No 
H4a HIE → NORM 0.193 (3.365)*** 0.057 0.196 0.039 Yes 
H4b HIE → COMP 0.185 (3.361)*** 0.055 0.187 0.050 Yes 
H5 NORM → COMP 0.434 (7.656)*** 0.057 0.439 0.276 Yes 
Endogenous Variable R2 Value SD of R2 Mean of R2 
COMP 0.202 0.045 0.216 
NORM 0.458 0.051 0.471 
Table 6.  Results of Hypothesis Testing 
Note: SD – Standard Deviation, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 

































































β (t-Value) Mean of β Differences of  β 
β (t-value) 
Effect Size (F2) 
Banking Higher Ed. Banking Higher Ed. Banking Higher Ed. 
H1a: TEAM → NORM -0.044 (0.483) 0.220 (2.216)* -0.035 0.220 0.264 (2.008)* 0.003 0.036 
H1b: TEAM → COMP 0.134 (1.716) 0.091 (0.995) 0.139 0.097 0.043 (0.346) 0.030 0.010 
H2a: ENT → NORM 0.166 (1.847) -0.003 (0.032) 0.163 -0.005 0.169 (1.213) 0.035 0.000 
H2b: ENT → COMP 0.037 (0.372) 0.319 (3.486)*** 0.027 0.310 0.282 (2.083)* 0.002 0.145 
H3a: RAT → NORM 0.379 (5.148)*** 0.232 (2.388)* 0.378 0.235 0.147 (1.204) 0.196 0.038 
H3b: RAT → COMP 0.169 (1.518) -0.006 (0.063) 0.171 -0.005 0.175 (1.159) 0.040 0.000 
H4a: HIE → NORM 0.368 (5.374)*** 0.087 (0.938) 0.373 0.096 0.281 (2.498)* 0.186 0.007 
H4b: HIE → COMP 0.408 (4.606)*** 0.106 (1.456) 0.399 0.106 0.301 (2.667)** 0.238 0.018 




R2 Differences (t-value) 
Banking Higher Ed. 
COMP 0.472 (6.560)*** 0.499 (8.026)*** 0.026 (0.276) 
NORM 0.348 (5.059)*** 0.185 (3.370)*** 0.163 (1.864) 
Table 7. Results of Multi-group Analyses (Banking vs. Higher Education) 
Note: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
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Appendix A – Measurement Items 
Construct Measurement Items Reference 
COMP* COMP1: If my organization experienced a data breach, the authority would take 
legal action against us. 
Self-developed 
by referencing 
(Hu et al., 2007) COMP2: The authorized parties (e.g., external auditors) expect us to protect 
sensitive data using standardized procedures and controls.  
COMP3: If my organization experienced a data breach and news of the breach 
became public, it would have a very bad impact on my organization’s image. 
TEAM TEAM1: Managers in my organization are warm and caring. They seek to develop 
employees' full potential and act as their mentors or guides. 
Adapted from 
(Helfrich et al., 
2007) TEAM2: My organization emphasizes human resources. High cohesion and morale 
are important. 
TEAM3: The glue that holds my organization together is loyalty and tradition. 
Commitment to this organization runs high. 
ENT ENT1: My organization is a very dynamic and entrepreneurial place. People are 
willing to stick their necks out and take risks. 
ENT2: Managers in my organization are risk-takers. They encourage employees to 
take risks and be innovative. 
RAT RAT1: Managers in my organization are coordinators and coaches. They help 
employees meet the organization's goals and objectives. 
RAT2: My organization emphasizes competitive actions and achievement. 
Measurable goals are important. 
RAT3: The glue that holds my organization together is the emphasis on tasks and 
goal accomplishment. A production orientation is commonly shared. 
HIE HIE1: My organization is a very formalized and structured place. Bureaucratic 
procedures generally govern what people do. 
HIE2: Managers in my organization are rule-enforcers. They expect employees to 
follow established policies and procedures. 
HIE3: The glue that holds my organization together is formal rules and policies. 
People feel that following the rules is important. 
NORM NORM1: In my organization, our top management think that we should follow ISP. Adapted from 
(Herath and 
Rao, 2009a) 
NORM2: In my organization, our bosses think that we should follow ISP. 
NORM3: In my organization, our colleagues think that we should follow ISP. 
Table A-1: Measurement Items (Note: * Formative) 
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Appendix B – Factor Loading 
 COMP ENT HIE NORM RAT TEAM 
COMP1 0.873 0.190 0.318 0.526 0.431 0.316 
COMP2 0.935 0.337 0.301 0.547 0.387 0.335 
COMP3 0.882 0.278 0.306 0.511 0.433 0.302 
ENT1 0.303 0.972 -0.077 0.181 0.340 0.407 
ENT2 0.309 0.973 -0.115 0.171 0.332 0.422 
HIE1 0.208 -0.209 0.876 0.217 0.210 -0.051 
HIE2 0.292 -0.112 0.941 0.241 0.274 0.073 
HIE3 0.391 -0.007 0.941 0.328 0.423 0.140 
NORM1 0.547 0.134 0.309 0.946 0.411 0.171 
NORM2 0.571 0.189 0.261 0.960 0.378 0.211 
NORM3 0.533 0.188 0.258 0.905 0.388 0.255 
RAT1 0.471 0.359 0.303 0.409 0.921 0.516 
RAT2 0.393 0.305 0.334 0.395 0.929 0.346 
RAT3 0.382 0.282 0.325 0.344 0.907 0.363 
TEAM1 0.316 0.410 0.084 0.236 0.452 0.931 
TEAM2 0.314 0.369 0.077 0.227 0.382 0.930 
TEAM3 0.360 0.413 0.054 0.170 0.422 0.934 
Table B-1: Factor Loading 
 
Appendix C - 3-step Measurement Invariance Testing 
We used the MICOM three-step procedure for measurement invariance testing (Henseler et al., 2016).  
We first assessed configural invariance by ensuring that (1) the same indicator variables were used in each 
group, (2) all the data were treated equally across groups, and (3) the same variance-based estimations were 
used for all the groups (Henseler et al., 2016).  We then evaluated compositional invariance by determining 
whether the correlational values were close to 1 and within the range of the confident intervals. Finally, we 
assessed invariance for means (Step 3a) and variances (Step 3b). If a mean difference or a variance 
difference between two groups falls within the range of the confident intervals, then equal mean value or 
equal invariance has been attained, respectively. We found that for a pair of group comparison, the criteria 
for compositional invariance was satisfied in the second step of MICOM. With compositional invariance, 
although the mean value equal and the variance equal were not fully attained in the third step, it is still 
possible to compare the standardized coefficients of the structural model across groups (Henseler et al., 
2016). Thus, we conclude that our Multi-Group Analysis (MGA) produced meaningful statistical results. 































































































































Table C-1: Measurement Invariance Testing 
Note: Corr. (Correlation), Comp. Inv. (Compositional Invariance), Mean Diff. (Mean Difference), Variance Diff. (Variance Difference) 
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